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According to Schumpeter, the creative process of economic development can be divided into 
the three distinguishable stages of invention, innovation (commercialization) and imitation. 
Following this theory, invention and innovation require different skills. This paper tests 
whether the invention and innovation stages should be undertaken by different agents. We 
also show why there is a rationale for the Schumpeterian entrepreneur to also include the 
inventor in the innovation process. Merging the two enhances the possibilities of successful 
commercialization since the inventor may further adapt the innovation to customer needs, 
transmit information and reduce uncertainty. This serves to expand the market opportunities 
for the entrepreneur. The empirical analysis is based on a survey covering Swedish patents 
granted to individuals and small firms. The results show that profitability increases by 21 
percent when the patent is licensed or sold to an entrepreneur, or if the inventor is employed 
in an entrepreneurial firm, as compared to commercialization undertaken by the inventor. 
Another important result is that, irrespective of commercialization mode, an active 
involvement of the inventor is shown to have a positive impact on performance. 
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Perhaps more than any other economist, Schumpeter (1911) is explicit about the economic 
function of the entrepreneur. By introducing innovations to the market, the entrepreneur 
distorts the prevailing equilibrium, challenges existing structures and sets industrial dynamics 
and economic development into motion. According to Schumpeter, the process of economic 
development can be divided into three clearly separate stages. The first stage implies technical 
discovery of new things or new ways of doing things, which Schumpeter refers to as 
invention. In the subsequent stage innovation occurs, i.e. the successful commercialization of 
a new good or service stemming from technical discoveries or, more generally, a new 
combination of knowledge (new and old). The final step in this three-stage process – imitation 
– concerns a more general adoption and diffusion of new products or processes to markets.  
For our purpose, the interesting part consists of the separation between the stages of 
invention and innovation. Schumpeter (1947, p.149) himself claims that “the inventor 
produces ideas, the entrepreneur ‘gets things done’ ….. an idea or scientific principle is not, 
by itself, of any importance for economic practice.” Thus, Schumpeter views the creation of 
technological opportunity as being basically outside the domain of the entrepreneur. Rather, 
the identification and exploitation of such opportunities is what distinguishes entrepreneurs, 
i.e., innovation. Nor did Schumpeter view entrepreneurs as risk-takers, even though he did not 
completely dismiss the idea and was aware that innovation contains elements of risk also for 
the entrepreneur. But basically, that task was attributed the capitalists who financed 
entrepreneurial ventures.  
This paper seeks to answer two questions associated with the way Schumpeter 
disconnected inventions and innovators. The first is simply whether Schumpeter was right on 
this issue and to what extent disconnecting the stages influences the success of 
commercialization. Focusing on entrepreneurs and small firms, does invention and innovation 
take place in independent units and to what extent is commercialization performance 
influenced by the degree of integration of these activities? What are the strategic implications 
for inventors that consider entering the market? Over the last decades, there are plenty of 
examples of fast-growing entrepreneurial firms that are based on individuals’ inventions, 
where Microsoft probably constitutes the most conspicuous case of a successful combination 
of the inventor and innovator role. However, there is also ample evidence of the opposite. 
Going back a few decades, but remaining within the same industry, William Shockley’s 
invention known as the semiconductor was brilliant. Still, his company − Shockley’s 
Semiconductors − performed less well but inspired several entrepreneurial employees who 
later choose to leave and try their own inventive and innovative capabilities (the “traitorous    
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eight”). More recently, entrepreneurial firms like Google and e-Bay have implemented (and 
refined) existing to technologies to exploit entrepreneurial opportunities. Thus, judging from 
anecdotic evidence, there seem to be examples of both inventors and innovators that have 
successfully commercialized new products.  
The second question concerns the involvement of the inventor in the 
commercialization process. More precisely, can we observe that entrepreneurs and small firms 
that actively involve the inventor in the commercialization of new products are more 
profitable? This is associated with the way inventive activities are organized, i.e. the degree of 
vertical integration of inventive and innovative stages and access to complementary assets, 
which can be traced to the environment in which they operate. In particular, the institutional 
design and the structure of the market are decisive (Teece 1986). This issue has not been 
empirically examined in the previous literature, with the exception of more explorative 
studies.
1  
We argue that the integration of the two stages may, in fact, be considered part of 
entrepreneurial ability as envisioned in the Schumpeter world. That is, reflecting the   
“combinatorial capability” required for successful commercialization. It is also likely to 
reduce uncertainty in entrepreneurial activities, as defined by Knight (1921), since 
commercialization may also imply adaptation of the original invention to specific market and 
firm conditions. Such adaptation is likely to rely on the private knowledge embodied in the 
inventor. In addition, the entrepreneur also reduces the risks of being exposed to increased 
competition from follow-up innovations by the inventor, or from other firms to which the 
inventor may find it profitable to license an invention. In fact, this suggests a bridge between 
Knight’s and Schumpeter’s approaches to entrepreneurship.  
To empirically address these issues, we will implement a unique database on Swedish 
patents granted to individuals and small firms. Data is collected through a survey with a 
response rate of 80 percent. In particular, the database contains information about the extent 
of commercialization of individual patents, whether the commercialization was successful and 
the role of the inventor in the commercialization process. Using discrete statistical models, we 
empirically examine how different explanatory factors (e.g., commercialization mode, firm 
type, activity of inventors) affect the performance. To the best of our knowledge, such an 
                                                 
1 Taking all firms into account, irrespective of size, there has been a clear tendency in the  20
th century towards 
an increased vertical integration of inventive (R&D) and producing activities according to for instance Teece 
(1988) and Aghion and Howitt (1998). Others challenge those findings and claim that technological progress and 
institutional changes have facilitated a vertically dispersed production structure (Arora et al. 2001; Grossman and 
Helpman 2002).     
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empirical analysis, where explanatory factors are related to the performance of patent 
commercialization, has not previously been carried out. 
2 
  The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief discussion of the inventor 
and the entrepreneur, drawing on previous insights in industrial organization theory, contract 
theory and the strategic management literature. The database and basic statistics are described 
in section 3. The statistical model is set up and explanatory variables are described in section 
4. The empirical estimations are shown in section 5, and the final section concludes. 
 
2. Entrepreneurs, invention and innovation 
Most contemporary theories of entrepreneurship build on the seminal contributions by 
Schumpeter (1911) who stressed the importance of innovative entrepreneurs as the main 
vehicle to move an economy forward from static equilibrium, Knight’s (1921) proposed role 
of the entrepreneur as someone who transforms uncertainty into a calculable risk and, 
somewhat later, Kirzner’s (1973) view that the entrepreneur moves an economy towards 
equilibrium (contrasting Schumpeter) by taking advantage of arbitrage possibilities. More 
generally, the research field of entrepreneurship has recently been defined as analyses of 
“how, by whom and with what consequences opportunities to produce future goods and 
services are discovered, evaluated and exploited” (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000).
3   
As regards by “whom”, an eclectic definition of the entrepreneur, that has become 
increasingly accepted, is suggested by Wennekers and Thurik (1999). The entrepreneur: i) is 
innovative, i.e. perceives and creates new opportunities; ii) operates under uncertainty and 
introduces products to the market, decides on location, and the form and use of resources; and 
iii) manages his business and competes with others for a share of the market.
4 Apparently, this 
definition can be linked to all three contributions referred to above. Note that invention is not 
explicitly mentioned (albeit creation of opportunity is) in this definition, nor excluded from 
the interpretation of entrepreneurship. Thus, it deviates, but is not completely disentangled, 
from Schumpeter’s (1911, p. 88-89 ) traditional view on innovation and invention: 
 
“Economic leadership in particular must hence be distinguished from ‘invention’. As long as they are 
not carried into practice, inventions are economically irrelevant. And to carry any improvement into effect is a 
task entirely different from the inventing of it, and a task, moreover, requiring entirely different kinds of 
aptitudes. Although entrepreneurs of course may be inventors just as they may be capitalists, they are inventors 
                                                 
2 In fact, Teece (2006) stress the importance of empirical research addressing precisely these issues.  
3 A related strand of the literature focuses on differences in individual capabilities (Carroll and Hannan 2000), or 
the interaction between the characteristics of opportunity and the characteristics of the people who exploit them 
(Casson 2005). Schumpeter also considered individual’s psychological capacity as the key in identifying 
opportunities.   
4 Here we adopt the somewhat modified version as introduced by Bianchi and Henrekson (2005).    
 
5
not by nature of their function but by coincidence and vice versa ... it is, therefore, not advisable, and it may be 
downright misleading, to stress the element of inventions as much as many writers do”.   
 
Obviously, Schumpeter foresaw possible situations when the inventor role may coincide with 
the innovator, even though such situations were considered to be exceptions to the rule.  
The Schumpeterian distinction between the role of the inventor and the entrepreneur 
has previously been challenged by Schmookler (1966). Based on case studies, he claimed that 
entrepreneurs discover opportunities to do promising R&D, rather than merely discovering 
promising outcomes of R&D that has been conducted by others. On a more aggregate level, 
the merging of the inventive and innovative stages is clearly stated in the neo-Schumpeterian 
growth models (Aghion and Howitt 1998). These models, however, share the later 
Schumpeter’s (1942) view of innovation as becoming routinized, where markets become 
dominated by a limited number of large firms. Hence, this approach would not be well 
designed to analyze the aspects of Schumpeterian entrepreneurship addressed in this paper.  
The Wennekers-Thurik definition of entrepreneurs also refers to uncertainty. 
Doubtlessly, Schumpeter was aware of the fact that new activities do involve elements of 
risk-taking, even though he did not stress that aspect as a dominating feature of 
entrepreneurship. Rather, the risk-taking part was orchestrated by capitalists that provided the 
finance required to embark on new ventures. It was Knight (1921) who developed the strand 
in entrepreneurial economics that stressed the entrepreneur’s role as a risk-bearing agent that 
to some extent contrasted – but also complemented – Schumpeter’s view.
5 
Thus, the earlier entrepreneurship literature suggests a plethora of different reasons as 
to why innovative activities are undertaken by entrepreneurs, and the specific attributes that 
characterizes entrepreneurs, but has little to say about the relationship between the inventor 
and the innovator. Since our research primarily aims to shed light on factors that explain 
successful commercialization, and the relationship between inventors and innovators in that 
process, the question is what guidance can be found in more recent theoretical contributions 
in the entrepreneurial literature? 
 
2.1 The organization of inventive and innovative activities: Theoretical framework and 
hypotheses 
                                                 
5 They were more aligned on other aspects of entrepreneurship. For instance, both Knight and Schumpeter 
shared the belief that entrepreneurial talent was a scarce resource. Such scarcity is not so much associated with 
entrepreneurs’ alertness, or with their professionalism, as with their psychology. More recently, Lazear (2005) 
suggests that entrepreneurs posses more balanced talents that span a number of skills. This could be argued to 
strengthen their “combinatorial capacity”, as compared to the more limited role of specialists. In the perspective 
of the issue we raise, the entrepreneur could be viewed as being endowed with multi-task talent, while the 
inventor is more of a specialist (Lindbeck and Snower 2000).    
 
6
The role of the inventor in the commercialization process, and in the organization of 
innovative activities, can be traced to at least two strands in the contemporary economic 
literature. The first refers to contractual arrangements, uncertainty and transaction costs, while 
the second emphasizes the institutional setup, market structure and strategic consideration 
associated with innovative activities. These two strands are not mutually exclusive but stress 
different aspects of crucial importance to comprehend the organization of production 
activities characterized by experimentation and uncertainty, and the implications for 
commercialization. We will briefly refer to each of these strands in the literature. 
Concerning the contractual aspects of organizing commercial activities that involves 
inventing and innovating segments, it goes back to Grossman and Hart’s (1986) seminal 
article on vertical integration. The degree of integration is related to market characteristics 
and the ex ante uncertainty about the outcome of inventive activities. More precisely, consider 
the following basic structure of an economy, where agents are assumed perfectly informed. 
Let v denote the value of an innovation for the customer, while e refers to research efforts, and 
E captures investments by the entrepreneur required in the commercialization process. 
Assume the probability (p) of a successful innovation to be increasing, strictly concave and 
separable in e and E, then  
 
) ( ) ( ) , ( E r e q E e p + = .       (1) 
 
Both the inventor and the entrepreneur are assumed to be risk-neutral, and to have a 
reservation utility that equals zero ( 0 , ≥ r q ) while costs are assumed to be linear. The 
welfare maximization problem can then be written in the following way,  
 
{ } E e v E e p − − ) , ( m a x .          ( 2 )  
 
The equilibrium inputs of inventive and innovative efforts is then determined in a standard 
way by the first-order condition, 
 
1 ) ( / ) ( /
* * = = E dE dr e de dq .          ( 3 )  
 
Hence, if perfect information prevailed about the outcome of the inventive activities, the 
equalization of the marginal contribution of research efforts and investments required for 
commercialization would form the basis of a contract between the inventor and the    
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entrepreneur. However, as pointed out by Grossman and Hart (1986), the presence of 
asymmetric information between the inventor and the innovator, and the inherited uncertainty 
in such processes, incur excessive transaction costs in setting up and monitoring such 
contracts. Therefore, the alternatives available to the entrepreneur are to integrate – employ – 
the inventor, or to buy or license the invention once it has materialized. Similarly, the inventor 
must ponder whether to supply research efforts as an independent agent or if integration with 
an entrepreneur is more lucrative.   
From a dynamic point of view, commercialization is likely to include a gradual 
adaptation (specific customer requirements) and follow-up inventions based on the original 
invention. In that case, the transmission of proprietary information is crucial for successful 
innovation, which may call for closer interaction between the entrepreneur and the inventor or 
research unit.
6 Assume that future inventions originate in the individual-specific knowledge of 
the inventor. Consider the non-integrated case where inventions are sequenced over two 
periods and knowledge transfers (e) between the inventor and the entrepreneur influence the 
occurrence of an innovation. The value of the innovation is split evenly between the inventor 
(α ) and the entrepreneur ( α − 1 ). If the inventor chooses to transfer information about 
invention in the first period, all revenue will be collected in that period. Alternatively, the 
inventor can wait to the second period and either commercialize the invention or sell the 
invention to another firm. The decision whether to transfer (e=1) knowledge or not (e=0) is 
non-contractible and must be incentive compatible, implying that
7  
 
1 0 2 1 2 1 0 1 / , v q v v v q ≥ ≥ α α .        (4) 
 
In the alternative, integrated, case the entrepreneur is dependent on knowledge 
transfers by the inventor to accomplish successful commercialization. If the invention – or the 
customers’ required modification of the invention – is not transferred to the entrepreneur in 
the first period, the inventor will get half of the (expected) value in the first period. The 
reward to the inventor in the integrated case is then,  
 
1 0 2 1 2 1 0 1 2 / , 2 / v q v v v q ≥ ≥ α α ,       (5) 
 
                                                 
6 See Frankel (1955), Teece (1988) and Aghion and Howitt (1992). 
7 Where 0 ), ( 0 0 > + = q E r e q p . See Aghion and Howitt (1998) for details.    
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implying that the costs (of invention) are lower in the integrated case as compared to the 
disintegrated case. Thus, in the case of incomplete contracts, there are strong incentives for 
entrepreneurs to vertically integrate with inventors or research units. Integrating the two 
stages implies cost savings and risk reduction.
8 In contrast to Schumpeter, we argue that 
integration of the inventive and innovative stages may be desirable since it facilitates 
communication between the entrepreneur and the inventor that serves to maintain 
competitiveness, facilitate customer-specific adaptation, and reduce the risks for the 
entrepreneur.   
A more profound microeconomic basis as regards the strategic choice between 
commercializing an invention in an independent firm, or licensing it to an incumbent firm, is 
provided by Teece (1986; 2006). He describes his 1986 model as a “nascent neo-
Schumpeterian theory”.
9 Teece (1986) identified three key factors that determine whether it 
would be the inventor/innovator, the following firms, or firms with related capacity – or 
complementary assets – that extract the profits from an invention. Those factors are i) the 
institutions tied to intellectual property rights (IPRs), ii) the extent to which complementary 
assets were needed for commercialization, and, iii) the emergence of a dominant design.
10 
Teece was thus not primarily preoccupied with the organizational regime between the 
inventor and the innovator rather he stressed the prerequisites governing the entry mode 
irrespective of whether it was the inventor or the innovator/entrepreneur that was about to 
launch a new product.  
The first of these factors, the appropriability or IPR regime, concerns the possibilities 
to protect the core know-how needed for invention, The critical issue is whether “iron clad” 
patents rights prevails or, alternatively, whether the components of the new product or process 
could be kept secret, i.e. remain within the firm without the risk of being copied or subject to 
disclosure in some other way. Obviously, this is associated with the degree of tacitness of the 
knowledge embodied in the invention.
11   
The second factor, and perhaps the most insightful ingredient in Teece’s framework, 
introduces the concept of complementary asset. Such assets could be described as 
                                                 
8 Arora (1995) presents an alternative model for the specific case where tacit knowledge (embodied in the 
inventor) can be bundled with arm’s length licensing contracts. The decisive factor is strong IPRs, which 
promote commercialization and a functioning market for know-how.        
9 Or, as noted in Teece (2006), partly based on Penrose (1959), partly on Schumpeter (1911). 
10 Note Scherer’s (1980) contribution, who claimed that innovative entry by entrepreneurs and innovative entry 
by large firms seem to fulfill complementary roles in the process of turning an innovation into full-scale, welfare 
enhancing new production activities. Major innovations often emanate in a serendipitous way from individual 
entrepreneurs (Baumol 2007).  
11 As noted by Mansfield et al. (1981), it takes imitators about four years to duplicate an invention for 
approximately 65 percent of the original costs. Process technology innovation tends to leak somewhat slower 
than product innovation (Mansfield 1985). 
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competencies and resources needed to successfully introduce a product to the market. 
Examples are different kinds of after-sale services, marketing resources, specialized 
manufacturing assets, etc. More precisely, complementary assets allude to different functions 
that normally are resource demanding and costly to invest in, but strategically important in 
order to reach the market. The type and structure of such assets influence the mode of 
commercialization. In particular, the more generic character of such assets, the more risky for 
the inventor/innovator to undertake in investment in them. Teece also mentions the capability 
to provide follow-up innovations as a particular complementary asset.
12 
The final item mentioned by Teece is the emergence of a dominant design. Typically, 
an industry that has been in an evolutionary stage characterized by fluid knowledge, 
experimentation and uncertainty, will at some point adopt a dominant design that become 
standard. Such standards may effectively preclude entry even though novel 
products/processes may be superior (Abernathy and Utterback 1978; David 1985; Arthur 
1989). Dynamic increasing returns to scale and path dependencies set in, and first mover 
advantage may become an important strategy. It is an evolutionary stage, which is particularly 
risky and difficult to predict.    
  To summarize Teece’s (1986) article, the inventor/innovator entry strategy should be 
contingent upon the weight of different factors referred to above, and the character of 
complementary assets needed for commercialization (generic characteristics). In many 
circumstances the probability that the entrepreneur will emerge as the winner is low, 
particularly if intellectual property rights are weak. Basically, if the inventor seeks to enter a 
market where incumbent firms control complementary assets, development and prototyping 
costs are huge, and intellectual property rights are strong, then the optimal strategy of the 
inventor/innovator is to contract out the novel product/process through licensing or selling the 
patent. A functioning “market for ideas” is thus crucial in Teece’s model. Moreover, it is not 
the market share of incumbents as such that matters, rather the “complementary” asset 
structure of the innovator, entry of timing and the contractual structure to access missing 
complementary asset.
13 
  Building on Teece, Gans and Stern (2003) further develop the obstacles that firms 
encounter in the commercialization process.
14 Stressing the interaction between the inventor 
and the innovator, they argue that effective commercialization requires careful screening of 
the institutional environment in which firms operate. If IPRs are poor and no competitor has 
                                                 
12 Teece (1986) discusses this in terms of ccumulative innovations. 
13 Mansfield (1968) was perhaps the first to observe that there was no statistical relationship between 
concentration in an industry and rate of technological change. 
14 See also Gans, Hsu and Stern (2007), analyzing the impact of uncertainty and timing of entry, either as a start-
up or in terms of licensing, high-technology products.       
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control of complementary assets it opens up opportunities for “attackers” and tend to foster 
integrated structures. On the other hand, if established firms control complementary assets (or 
markets depend on firms’ reputational capital) then cooperation is the strategy to pursue. 
Successful commercialization depends on bargaining power and how incumbents could be 
outplayed against each other. Thus, the drivers of commercialization strategy are dependent 
on i) excludability environment, IPRs, and technological design, together with, ii) the 
complementary asset environment which often is costly to duplicate.
15 
Hence, being first to the market in order to pre-empt commercial opportunities for 
competitors is one option facing inventors. A first-mover advantage could originate in 
technological leadership, securing strategic assets or by implementing a dominant design that 
preclude later entrants due to the appearance of buyer and switching costs (Lieberman and 
Montgomery 1988). Being first to market is not however a guarantee for success. The most 
common reasons for first-mover disadvantages to accrue are that free-riders are likely to incur 
lower costs since they can take advantage of competitors outlays on R&D and information, 
enhance their learning and exploiting spillovers, as well as act from a position where potential 
market (and technological) uncertainties may have been resolved. Dominant incumbents may 
be slow innovators but could transform into highly aggressive followers. Again, this depends 
on the institutional regime and the market structure.  
In summary, taking a dynamic perspective and drawing on theoretical insights, there 
seem to be compelling reasons why incumbent entrepreneurs should undertake 
commercialization. The absence of complementary assets in start-up firms, and the costly 
investments required to build up such assets, constitutes one set of reasons as to why 
established firms have an advantage as compared to inventors. In addition, several factors 
points to the advantages of integrating the inventive and innovative stages into the same 
organization, thereby contrasting Schumpeter’s original ideas. An integrated structure should 
increase the probability of successful commercialization if communication of technological 
knowledge is important for commercialization, firms have previous experience in 
commercialization of inventions yielding a cost advantage as compared to start-ups by 
inventors, and if cooperation between inventors and entrepreneurs enhances technological and 
                                                 
15 The type of innovation could also influence the strategic choice of entry, i.e. whether it is radical or 
incremental and to what extent the innovation challenges technological or organizational knowledge. Innovation 
characterized as a reshuffling of the way in which different components are linked to each other while the core 
concept remains – architectural innovation – often take place in larger firms and give smaller firms an innovative 
edge in terms of more flexibility (Henderson and Clark 1990).     
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market knowledge within a firm.
16 This could be condensed to the following two testable 
hypotheses:   
 
Hypothesis 1: If the inventor sells or licenses the patent, or if the inventor is employed (and 
not owner) by a firm which commercializes the patent, then the performance of the 
commercialization should be more profitable as compared to commercialization undertaken 
by the inventor. 
 
Hypothesis 2: If the inventor is active in the commercialization process the inventor may 
further adapt the innovation to customer needs, transmit information and reduce uncertainty. 
This is expected to positively influence profits, particularly if commercialization is 
undertaken by someone else than the inventor.  
 
2.2 Measuring inventions and commercialization: Empirical findings 
To measure inventions, the most frequently used variable is patents, where data has been 
collected from national patent offices. Patent offices do however not know whether the 
patents have been commercialized, or whether commercialization was successful, since 
detailed information on performance has seldom been collected.
17 The few previous studies 
using such databases have focused on estimating the market value of patents, rather than 
analyzing how different strategies are related to the performance (Rossman and Sanders, 
1957; Sanders et al., 1958; Sanders, 1962, 1964; Schmookler, 1966; Cutler, 1984; SRI 
International, 1985; Griliches et al., 1987; Hall, 1993).
18 The main conclusions of these 
studies are that the mean value of patents is positive, but the median value is zero or negative, 
thus indicating a very large dispersion in economic value. 
Another strand of the patent literature has analyzed the renewal of patents (see e.g. 
Pakes 1986; Schankerman and Pakes 1986; Griliches, 1990). The owners must pay a renewal 
fee to keep their patents in force – in many countries every year. Griliches argues that the 
percentage of renewed patents indicates how large a share of the patents has a positive 
                                                 
16 We would expect inventors and innovators to be endowed by heterogeneous ability as regards information 
activities. It depends on their technological and market knowledge, i.e. learning from previous experience and 
occupation (von Hayek 1937, Frank 1988). Hence, it can be assumed that inventors possess more of 
technological knowledge and less of market knowledge, whereas the opposite is the case for the entrepreneur. 
17 Very few studies have used questionnaires. See, for instance, Griliches (1990). 
18 A highly promising and recent research initiative is the PatVal-EU project (Giuri et al., 2007). The ambition is 
to gather data through questionnaires sent out to a large number of EU-countries (presently six countries are 
covered). The questionnaire targets inventors and will focus on data related to value of patents, source of 
innovations, degree and mode of commercialization, etc. Gambardella et al. (2007) implement the PatVal-EU 
database to analyze the determinants of licensing. Their study deviates from the current insofar that the focus of 
the current paper is the profitability of commercialization and the role of the inventor in the commercialization 
process.         
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economic value after different numbers of years. The models in Pakes (1986) and 
Schankerman and Pakes (1986) are based on the assumption that more valuable patents are 
renewed for longer periods than less valuable patents. The main conclusions of these studies 
are that most patents have a low value and that it depreciates fast, and only a few have a 
significant high value. In other words, the value distribution of patents is severely skewed to 
the right. 
There are some problems with the renewal measurement. First, the renewal fee is a 
relatively low annual cost, implying that patents renewed for the whole statutory period may 
still have a low value. There is also an identification problem, where it is almost impossible 
for the observer to know whether the renewed patent has a low or a high value. Second, 
patents that are not renewed need not have a low value, since the product, based on the patent, 
might have been commercialized with a short lifetime. In this lifetime, the product could 
either have been profitable for the owner or not. Finally, the renewal studies do not say 
anything about whether the patent has been commercialized and whether any innovation has 
been introduced on the market. Although most commercialized patents can be expected to be 
renewed and most non-commercialized patents to expire, there are many exceptions as shown 
in section 3. One obvious advantage with renewal studies is that patents can be valuable for 
the owner even if they are never commercialized. The owner might either wish to deter 
competitors from using the invention or the patent serves as a shadow patent protecting other 
similar patents. 
Finally, there is another interesting aspect of previous studies: Irrespective of how the 
success, or the value, of patents has been measured, these studies have seldom related this 
measure to explanatory factors. An exception is Maurseth (2005), who tested how patent 
citations across and within technology fields influence the renewal of patents. 
 
3. Database and descriptive statistics  
In order to test how different strategies influence the performance of patent 
commercialization, we use a detailed database on individual Swedish patents granted to 
individual inventors and small firms.
19 In a previous pilot study (Svensson, 2002), the 
commercialization started within five years after the application year for most patents.
20  
                                                 
19 In 1998, 2760 patents were granted in Sweden. 776 of these were granted to foreign firms, 902 to large 
Swedish firms with more than 1000 employees, and 1082 to Swedish individuals and firms with less than 1000 
employees. In the pilot survey carried out in 2002, it turned out that large Swedish firms refused to provide 
information on individual patents. Furthermore, it proved very difficult to persuade foreign firms to fill in 
questionnaires about patents. These firms are mostly large multinationals firms. Therefore, the population 
consists of 1082 patents granted to Swedish individuals and firms with less than 1000 employees. 
20 All inventions do not result in patents. However, since an invention, which does not result in a patent, is not 
registered anywhere, there are two problems in empirically analyzing the invention rather than the patent. First, it    
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According to Pakes (1986), most of the uncertainty about the value of the patent is resolved 
during the first three-four years after the patent application. Therefore, patents granted in 1998 
were chosen for the current database.
21 1082 patents were granted to Swedish individual 
inventors and small firms in 1998. This sample selection is not a problem, as long as the 
conclusions drawn refer to small firms and individuals. Information about inventors, applying 
firms and their addresses for each patent was bought from the Swedish Patent and 
Registration Office (PRV). Thereafter, a questionnaire was sent out to the inventors.
22  
In the questionnaire, we asked the inventors about the work place where the invention 
was created, if and when the patent was commercialized, which kind of commercialization 
mode was chosen, as well as the outcome of the commercialization. As many as 867 of the 
inventors filled in and returned the questionnaire, i.e., the response rate was 80 percent (867 
out of 1082). This response rate is satisfactorily high, considering that inventors or applying 
firms usually regard information about inventions and patents to be secret. Non-responses are 
primarily due to the addresses from PRV being out of date and to a smaller degree due to 
inventors refusing to reply. 
 
3.1 Descriptive statistics 
The commercialization rate of the 867 patents is described across firm groups in Table 1. The 
major share – 85 percent – of the patents was applied for between 1994 and 1997. As many as 
408 patents (47 percent) were granted to individual inventors,
23 while 116 (13 percent), 201 
(23 percent) and 142 (17 percent) patents were granted to medium-sized firms (101-1000 
employees), small firms (11-100 employees) and close companies (2-10 employees), 
respectively. In 2003, commercialization had been started for 530 of these patents. The term 
commercialization here means that the owners of the patent have introduced an innovation in 
an existing or in a new firm, licensed or sold the patent. The commercialization rate of the 
firm groups varies between 66 and 74 percent, whereas the corresponding rate of the 
individuals is not higher than 52 percent. A contingent-table test suggests there to be a 
                                                                                                                                                          
is impossible to find these new ideas, products and developments among all firms and individuals. On the other 
hand, all patents are registered. Second, even if the “inventions” are found, it is difficult to judge whether they 
are sufficient improvements to be called inventions. Only the national and international patent offices make such 
judgements. Therefore, the choice of the patent rather than the invention is the only alternative for an empirical 
study of the commercialization process. 
21 The database was collected in 2003-04. The year the patent is granted is used here, but patents filed in a 
specific year might have been preferable. The choice of patents granted in a specific year is, however, not a 
problem in the statistical estimations. 
22 Each patent always has at least one inventor and often also an applying firm. The inventors or the applying 
firm can be the owner of the patent, but the inventors can also indirectly be owners of the patent, via the applying 
firm. Sometimes the inventors are only employed in the applying firm which owns the patent. If the patent had 
more than one inventor, the questionnaire was sent to one inventor only. 
23 The group of individual inventors includes private persons, self-employed inventors as well as two-three 
inventors who are organized in trading companies or private firms without employees.    
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significant difference in the commercialization rate between firms and individuals. The chi-
square value is 30.55 (with 3 d.f.), significant at the one-percent level. 
 
******** [Table 1] ******** 
  
  At the end point of observation (year 2003), the inventors were asked to estimate 
whether the commercialized invention would yield profit, attain break-even or result in a loss. 
If they did not know, the reply was registered as a missing value (uncertain outcome).
24 In 
Table 2, discrete values of the outcome in profit terms are described across firm groups. It 
would have been desirable to measure the outcome in money terms. However, such 
information was impossible to collect.
25 Since the patents were granted in 1998 and some of 
them were commercialized even later, the expected profit level could not be determined for 
around 12 percent of the commercialized patents. As described in the table, the outcome is 
quite different across firm groups, where the group of individual inventors has the least 
favorable outcome, but there may be other underlying factors explaining this difference, e.g., 
the commercialization mode or the fact that the new product replaced an earlier one. 
 
******** [Table 2] ******** 
 
In Table 3, outcomes are described across commercialization mode and whether 
inventors were active during the commercialization. Patents commercialized in new firms 
have a worse performance than the other modes. Let us divide the modes into two groups: 1) 
somebody else than the inventor is responsible for the commercialization (selling, licensing 
the patent or the existing firm where the inventor is employed); and 2) the inventor 
commercializes in his own firm (existing firm where the inventor is an owner, and new 
firms). It is then obvious that the former group has a better performance. A contingent table 
test based on the subtotals gives the chi-square-value 28.70, significant at the one-percent 
level. In the lower part of Table 3, there is no evidence that the activity of inventors during the 
commercialization has any impact on the performance. Thus, based on descriptive statistics, it 
seems like the Schumpeter view that the stages of invention and innovation should be 
separated activities is correct. 
 
                                                 
24 For a vast majority of the patents, the commercialization had reached such a stage that there was no 
uncertainty at all about the performance. 
25 It is very complicated to estimate profit flows, because most firms have many products in their statement of 
account, and many individuals do not have any statement of account at all.    
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******** [Table 3] ******** 
 
One objection against the measurement of success in this study would be that the 
patent might be profitable for the owners, even if it is never commercialized, e.g., if it serves 
as a blocking or shadow patent. If this is the case, the owner should have more similar granted 
patents. Among the commercialized patents in the database, 46 percent of the owners have at 
least one more similar patent. Among non-commercialized patents, this percentage share is 
only 33 percent. If the patent had not been commercialized, the inventor was also asked: why? 
Among the 337 non-commercialized patents, only 15 inventors answered that the patent 
served as a defensive patent – with the purpose of deterring competitors from using the 
invention or defending other patents (shadow-patent). Thus, we conclude that keeping patents 
to defend other patents is less common among individuals and small firms. This strategy is 
more frequent among large multinational firms. 
In Table 4, the outcome of commercialization is shown for expired and renewed 
patents. Owners must pay an annual renewal fee to the national patent office to keep their 
patents in force. If the renewal fee is not paid in one single year, the patent expires. The 
general pattern is that patents still alive have a higher share of successful outcomes as 
compared to expired patents, but the probability of a successful outcome also increases the 
longer the life of the expired patent. However, there are many exceptions. For example, some 
patents, which expired after only 1-5 years, were profitable, while many patents still renewed 
and commercialized have been losses to the owners. Thus, by only studying the pattern of 
renewal rates, as most previous studies has done, incorrect conclusions might be drawn about 
the profitability of patents.  
 
******** [Table 4] ******** 
 
4. Econometric model and explanatory variables 
4.1 Econometric model 
The dependent variable, PERFORM, in the empirical estimations measures the performance 
in profit terms of the commercialization for the original owner of the patent. It can take on 
three different discrete values denoted by index k: 
 
•  Profit, k=2; 
•  Break-even, k=1; 




Since it is possible to order the three alternatives, an ordered probit model is applied.
26 A 
multinomial logit model fails to take the ranking of the outcomes into account. On the other 
hand, an ordinary regression would treat the outcomes 0, 1 and 2 as realizations of a 
continuous variable. This would be an error, since the discrete outcomes are only ranked. The 
ordered probit model can be described in the following way (Greene, 1997): 
 
where Xi is a vector of patent-specific characteristics. The vector of coefficients, α, shows the 
influence of the independent variables on the profit level. The residual vector εi represents the 
combined effects of unobserved random variables and random disturbances. The residuals are 
assumed to have a normal distribution and the mean and variance are normalized to 0 and 1. 
The vector with the latent variable, yi
*, is unobserved. The model is based on the cumulative 
normal distribution function, F(Xα), and is estimated via maximum likelihood procedures. 
The difference with the two-response probit model is here that a parameter (threshold value), 
ω, is estimated by α. The probabilities Pi(k) = Pi(y=k) for the three outcomes are: 
 
The threshold value, ω, must be larger than 0 for all probabilities to be positive. 
  An objection against the sample and the chosen statistical model would be that the 
patents, which are commercialized, are not a random sample of patents, but have specific 
characteristics that led to them being commercialized in the first place. This could result in 
misleading parameter estimates. An appropriate statistical model is therefore an ordered 
                                                 
26 There were 86 observations in the database, where the owner could not specify the expected profit level of the 
commercialization. These missing values could also be treated as a fourth, uncertain, outcome of PERFORM. A 
multinomial logit model, where all four alternatives were included, was estimated. Then, we accomplished a test 
for independence of irrelevant alternatives (Hausmann and McFadden, 1984). When excluding the uncertain 
alternative in the multinomial logit model, this test cannot be rejected. Thus, the parameter estimates between the 
other outcome alternatives are almost unaffected if the uncertain alternative is excluded. Then, there is no 
problem in excluding those patents with unknown profit-levels from the estimations. 
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probit model with sample selectivity (Greene, 2002). In the first step, a probit model estimates 
how different factors influence the decision to commercialize the patent: 
 
where di* is a latent index and di is the selection variable, indicating whether the patent is 
commercialized or not. Zi is a vector of explanatory variables, which influence the probability 
that the patent is commercialized and θ is a vector of parameters to be estimated. ui is a vector 
of  normally distributed residuals with zero mean and a variance equal to 1. 
From the probit estimates, the selection variable di is then used to estimate a full 
information maximum likelihood model of the ordered probit model (Greene, 2002).
27 At the 
same time, the first step probit model is re-estimated. The residuals [ε, u] are assumed to have 
a bivariate standard normal distribution and correlation ρ. There is selectivity if ρ is not equal 
to zero. 
 
4.2 Main explanatory variables 
In this section and the next one, we will present the explanatory variables. The basic statistics 
of these variables are shown in Table 5. Our prime interest concerns how the role of the 
inventor influences the commercialization outcome. 
There are five main modes of commercialization: 1) selling the patent; 2) licensing the 
patent; 3) commercialization in an existing firm where inventors are employed; 4) 
commercialization in an existing firm where inventors are owners; and 5) commercialization 
in a new firm. We define four different groups of dummies for the commercialization mode, 
which are included in four different models. 
In our first definition, we use the first mode of commercialization chosen by the 
owners when the commercialization starts. Since the five modes are mutually exclusive, four 
different additive dummies are assigned. SELL takes on the value of 1 if the patent was sold 
and 0 otherwise. LIC equals 1 if the patent was licensed, and 0 otherwise. EMPL takes on the 
value of 1 if the patent was commercialized in an existing firm where inventors are employed 
and 0 otherwise. If the patent was commercialized in a new firm, NEW equals 1, and 0 
otherwise. The reference group is here patents commercialized in an existing firm where the 
inventor is the owner.  
                                                 
27 This is not a two-step Heckman model. No Lambda is computed and used in the second step.  
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In the second definition, we merge the three dummies SELL, LIC and EMPL into one 
dummy EXTERN. Thus, EXTERN takes on the value of 1 if somebody else than the inventor 
is responsible for the commercialization, and 0 if the inventor commercializes in his own firm 
(existing or new). The expected impacts of these variables on the profitability were set up in 
section 2 and are shown in Table 5. 
 
******** [Table 5] ******** 
 
According to the hypothesis 2, activity of the inventors should be important for the 
commercialization performance. We measure inventor activity (ACTIVE) as a dummy, which 
equals 1 if the inventors had an active role during the commercialization and 0 otherwise. 
ACTIVE is expected to have a positive influence on the profit level. 
However, the influence of the inventors’ activity should also depend on the 
commercialization mode. When inventors are also owners and commercialize in an existing 
firm or start a new firm, they are almost always active. When the patent is sold, the activity of 
inventors should have no impact on the original owners’ profit, since the owners have already 
been paid. The interesting issue to test is when somebody else than inventors is responsible 
for the commercialization and inventors have an incentive to work hard during the 
commercialization. ACTIVE1 is an interaction dummy between ACTIVE and LIC or EMPL. 
Thus, it takes on the value of 1 when inventors are active and when the patent is licensed or 
commercialized in an existing firm where inventors are employed. ACTIVE2 i s  a l s o  a n  
interaction dummy between ACTIVE and the other three modes of commercialization. 
ACTIVE2 equals 1 when inventors are active and the patent is sold or commercialized in a 
new firm or an existing firm where inventors are owners. 
 
4.3 Control variables 
The control variables might be correlated with the profitability of the commercialization. 
Firms and individuals have different resources for renewing their patents, so additive 
dummies for different firm sizes are included. MEDIUM is a dummy that takes on the value 
of 1 for medium-sized firms with 101-1000 employees and 0 otherwise. SMALL equals 1 for 
small firms with 11-100 employees and 0 otherwise. Finally, MICRO is a third dummy taking 
the value of 1 for micro companies with 2-10 employees and 0 otherwise. The firm group 
dummies are here related to the reference group of individual inventors. 
PATSTOCK measures the owner’s stock of Swedish patents at the application date and 
indicates the experience of the patent owner. Since patents can be commercialized directly    
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after application, the patent stock is measured at the application date rather than the grant 
date.
28 REPLACE is a dummy that equals 1 if the product based on the patent replaces a 
previous product of the patent owner, and 0 otherwise. If the new product replaces an earlier 
product, the commercialization is expected to be facilitated. MOREPAT i s  a n  a d d i t i v e  
dummy, which equals 1 if the inventors or the applying firm have more competitive Swedish 
patents in the same technology area, and 0 otherwise. A further variable measuring the 
complexity of the product is included. PARTSYST equals 1 if the patent is part of a larger 
system/product, and 0 otherwise. 
COMYEAR measures the year when the commercialization started. The later is the 
starting year, the fewer are the years until the end of the observation (2003). WAITYEAR 
measures the number of years between the application year and the starting year of the 
commercialization. COMYEAR and WAITYEAR might, but need not be correlated since the 
patents have different application years. Some specific characteristics of the inventors are also 
included. ETH measures the share of inventors who belong to ethnical minorities, i.e. an 
ethnical background other than West European or North American. SEX measures the share of 
inventors who are females. 
Different technologies are likely to be connected with different payoffs and risks. 
Consequently, the technology class can affect the profit level, given that the patent is 
commercialized. Patents are divided into 30 technology groups according to Breschi et al. 
(2004). These groups are based on the patents’ main IPC-Class. However, all technology 
groups are not represented in the dataset and some groups do not have enough observations.
29 
Therefore, only 16 groups and 15 additive dummies are used in the present study. The data is 
also divided into six different kinds of regions according to the Swedish Agency for 
Economic and Regional Growth (1998): Large-city regions, university regions, regions with 
important primary city centers, regions with secondary city centers, small regions with private 
employment, and small regions with government employment. Five additive dummies are 
included for these six groups in the estimations. 
  Something should also be said about the explanatory variables, which are expected to 
affect the commercialization decision (COM) and are included in the probit equation. These 
variables are listed in Appendix Table A1. The identification of this step is based on the 
model in Svensson (2007), where the commercialization decision was analyzed using 
                                                 
28 The alternative to measure the owner’s patent stock at the grant date does not alter the results of the 
estimations. 
29 A technology class must have at least one observation in each of the three outcome alternatives, to obtain an 
own technology dummy. Technology classes without enough observations are instead merged with other closely 




30  MEDIUM, SMALL,  MICRO,  MOREPAT, PATSTOCK,  ETH,  SEX, the 
region and technology dummies, as described above, are included in the first step. 
Furthermore, time dummies for the application year, and six further variables (GOVRD, 
PRIVRD,  OTHRD,  OWNER,  KOMPL and INVNMBR) are added.
31 On the other hand, 
variables characterizing the commercialization, e.g., commercialization mode (SELL,  LIC, 
EMPL and NEW), ACTIVE, REPLACE, etc., cannot be included. This means that different 
explanatory variables are included in the probit and ordered probit models when sample 
selectivity is taken into account.  
 
5. Empirical estimations  
Two different models are estimated. In Model I, the first definition of commercialization 
mode is used, i.e. the first choice when the patent is commercialized. In Model II, we instead 
include the alternative dummy, EXTERN, which measure whether somebody else than the 
inventor is responsible for the commercialization. To test for robustness, three variants with 
region and technology dummies are estimated. In these variants, region dummies (A), 
technology dummies (B) and both region and technology dummies (C) are included. The 
models are also estimated by full information maximum likelihood, taking account of sample 
selectivity. The previous inclusion of dummy variables (A-C) is then repeated (D-F).  
The results of the ordered probit estimations of Model I are shown in Table 6. In 
general, sample selectivity (Models D-F) decreases the significance levels of the parameters 
and reduces the parameter estimates. Considering the commercialization mode, licensing or 
selling the patent has a positive impact on the profit level as compared to commercializing in 
an existing firm, where the inventor is the owner. SELL is always significant at the five-
percent level, whereas LIC has different significant levels. The parameter of NEW is negative, 
but not even significant at the ten-percent level. By recalculating the parameter estimates, 
however, it is easily seen at the bottom of the table that selling or licensing the patent has a 
positive influence on the profit level as compared to the new firm alternative – the differences 
are always significant at the five-percent level. Thus, it is more profitable that the inventors 
let somebody else be responsible for the commercialization than to start a new firm. This 
corroborates Schumpeter’s stage approach and is in line with Hypothesis 1. 
                                                 
30 The difference is that a probit model is used in the first step of the present model, whereas Svensson (2007) 
used survival models. 
31 GOVRD measures how large a share of the R&D-costs that was financed from the government. Similarly, 
PRIVRD and OTHRD measure how large shares of this financing were from private venture capitalists and 
research foundations / universities, respectively. OWNER measures how large a share (in percent) of the patent 
that is directly or indirectly owned by the inventors. The dummy variable KOMPL takes on the value of 1 if 
complementing patents are needed to create a product and 0 otherwise. INVNMBR measures the number of 
inventors of the patent.    
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However, a result that contradicts Schumpeter is that the activity of the inventors 
during the commercialization is very important for the performance. We are especially 
interested in ACTIVE1, which measures if the inventors were active when somebody else than 
the inventor is responsible for the commercialization. ACTIVE1 always has a positive and 
highly significant impact on the profit-level, which supports Hypothesis 2. Thus, it seems like 
inventors are more important as knowledge transmitters than as firm creators/entrepreneurs 
when patents are commercialized. These results also hold when we take account of sample 
selectivity. ACTIVE2 is also significant, but the interpretation of this influence is problematic, 
since it is obvious that inventors are active if they are owners of the patent. 
 
******** [Table 6] ******** 
 
The results of Models II are described in Table 7. The estimated parameter of EXTERN is 
positive and significant, at least at the 5 percent level in all runs. Thus, there is a higher 
probability of successful commercialization if somebody else than the inventor is responsible 
for the commercialization, which is in line with Schumpeter. The results of ACTIVE1 and 
ACTIVE2 are similar to Model I. Once again, the results support both Hypotheses 1 and 2. 
 
******** [Table 7] ******** 
 
The results for the control variables are similar between Models I and II. All firm group 
dummies have positive and strongly significant impacts on the profit level, implying that 
patents commercialized by firms have a higher probability of success as compared to patents 
commercialized by individuals. However, the parameter of MICRO is not significant when 
sample selectivity is taken into account. Furthermore, the parameters of MEDIUM, SMALL 
and MICRO are not significantly different from each other. Among the other variables, only 
REPLACE and MOREPAT have significant effects on the profit level. The significance level 
of REPLACE depends on which dummy variables are included, whereas the significance of 
MOREPAT disappears when sample selection is included. 
The size interpretation of the important or significant estimated parameters is shown in 
Table 8. These effects are calculated around the means of the xi:s. The marginal effects on the 
probabilities are lower when sample selection is included (I-F). If the patent is sold instead of 
commercialized in an existing firm, where the inventor is the owner, the probability of a 
profitable commercialization increases by 21 percentage units in model I-F. At the same time, 
the probabilities of a breakeven or a loss result decrease by 10 and 11 percentage units,    
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respectively. If the inventors are active during the commercialization when somebody else is 
responsible for the commercialization, the probability of a profitable outcome increases by 17 
percentage units in model I-F. The marginal effects of the other dummy variables are 
interpreted in the same way. We also calculate the marginal effects for EXTERN in Models II-
C and II-F. If the inventor is not responsible for the commercialization, the probability of a 
successful commercialization increases by 22 percentage units, while the probability of a 
breakeven or loss result decreases by 8 and 14 percentage units, respectively (Model II-F). 
 
******** [Table 8] ******** 
 
Some other variants of the models were also estimated in order to test for robustness.
32 
Firstly, the owner may change the commercialization mode. This occurs in 46 cases in the 
data set. For example, a patent, which is originally commercialized in the inventor’s, own 
firm may later be sold or licensed. Therefore we redefined the commercialization mode 
variables (SELL, LIC, EMPL and NEW as well as EXTERN) to take account of that a specific 
mode may occur at a later date. For example, SELL then takes on the value of 1 if the patent is 
sold initially or at a later date, and 0 otherwise. The other mode variables are treated in a 
similar manner. However, the estimations gave almost the same results – both with regard to 
the size of the estimated parameters and the significance levels. 
  Secondly, we experimented with the sample criteria. In our main sample with 466 
commercialized patents, all patents where the owner is either an individual inventors or a firm 
with less than 1000 employees were included. According to EU, large firms have more than 
500 employees and small firms less than 250 employees. Therefore, we also estimated the 
models with sample criteria of: a) less than 500 employees that generated a sample of 453 
commercialized patents; and b) less than 250 employees, which gave a sample of 434 
commercialized patents. The results of these estimations show that the effect of the 
commercialization mode variables (SELL, LIC and EXTERN) is approximately the same on 
the performance. 
Thirdly, a limitation of the study is that we only have dummies for different 
technology classes and not for different industry/markets segments. The market segment 
could be a proxy of how costly or risky it is for an inventor to start a business by himself.  
Finally, additive dummies for unique owners (firms/inventors) were also included in 
the estimations, but this did not work out very well. When including dummies for unique 
                                                 
32 These estimations are available from the authors upon request.    
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owners, the models were characterized by severe multicollinearity problems with extremely 
high standard errors for the owner dummies.
33 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
Drawing on recent insights gained in several fields of economics, we have empirically 
analyzed Schumpeter’s (1911) original assertion that the stages of invention and innovations 
should be separated activities, how different levels of integration affect commercialization, 
and the extent to which inventor involvement in the commercialization process influences 
profitability.  
The empirical analysis is based on a survey covering Swedish patents owned by small 
firms and individuals, where the response rate is 80 percent. The data allows us to observe the 
performance in profit terms when patents are commercialized as well as which strategies the 
inventors and owners have used. The estimations show that commercialization performance is 
superior when the inventor is not responsible for the commercialization (patent is sold or 
licensed, or the inventor is employed and not an owner in the firm) as compared to the 
alternative when the inventor commercializes in his own existing or new firm. In the former 
case, the probability of a successful commercialization is 21 percentage units higher than in 
the latter case. This is in line with Schumpeter’s view that invention and innovation should be 
separate stages. In addition, it is shown that the activity of inventors during the 
commercialization is important for the performance, particularly when the patent is licensed 
or when the inventor is employed and not an owner. The explanation would be that the 
inventor is important for further adaptation of the innovation and to reduce uncertainty. In this 
sense, the results contradict Schumpeter’s view that invention and innovation are separate 
stages. The overall interpretation of the estimations is that inventors are more successful as 
transmitters of knowledge than as firm creators or entrepreneurs. 
If it is better to let somebody else be responsible for the commercialization, why do 
not all inventors sell or license their patents? There are two possible explanations. First, 
licensing and selling contracts are characterized by asymmetric information, i.e. inventors 
know much more about the patent than potential manufacturing firms. This causes high 
transaction and search costs when bringing inventors and manufacturing firms together. It is 
likely that too few patents are sold or licensed. The only alternative for many inventors is then 
                                                 
33 Among the 530 commercialized patents in the sample, there are 460 unique owners (firms/inventors). 418 
owners only have one commercialized patent, 29 owners have two patents, and only 13 owners have at least 
three patents. Dummies can only be assigned to those 42 owners with at least 2 patents. The multicollinearity 
problems occurred even when all technology and region dummies were excluded and when dummies were only 
included for those 13 owners with at least three commercialized patents. 
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to commercialize in their own firms. Second, the poor performance of inventors when they 
attempt to commercialize a new product may be due to lack of experience and over-optimistic 
behavior. Such interpretation corroborates previous research by, for instance, de Meza and 
Southey (1996), Arabsheibani et al. (2000) and Fraser and Greene (2006). 
The analysis pursued in this paper also suggests a framework where the theories of 
Knight’s risk defining entrepreneur and Schumpeter’s innovative entrepreneur can be bridged. 
An entrepreneur who integrates the inventive stage in the innovation process enhances the 
possibilities of successful commercialization, since this facilitates customer-specific 
adaptation and the transmission of information, simultaneously as uncertainty is reduced. This 
serves to expand market opportunities for the entrepreneur. A future research task would be to 
provide a rigorous theoretical setting where both these aspects of entrepreneurship are 
included.  
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Table 1. Commercialization of patents across firm sizes and inventors’ ownership, 
number of patents and percent. 
Number of patents 





Medium-sized firms (101-1000 employees)    77    39  116  66 % 
Small firms (11-100 employees)  137    64  201  68 % 
Close companies (2-10 employees)  105    37  142  74 % 
Inventors alone (1-4 inventors)  211  197  408  52 % 







Table 2. Performance of the commercialization across firm groups, number of patents. 
Performance  Kind of firm where the invention 




Medium-sized firms    53  18     3    3    77 
Small firms    95  22    15    5  137 
Close companies    48  12    27  18  105 
Inventors alone    46  43    84  38  211 
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Table 3. Performance of the commercialization across commercialization modes and 
active role of the inventors, number of patents. 
Performance 




Sold patent    10    3     7    0    20 
Licensed patent    19    9    14  10    52 
Existing firm, inventor is employed  103  30    15  10  158 
Subtotal 132  42  36  20  230 
Existing firm, inventor is owner  100  45    62  25  232 
New firm    10    8    31  19    68 
Subtotal 110  53  93  44  300 
Total 242  95  129  64  530 
  Chi-square (3 d.f.) = 28.70 *** (based on sub-totals) 
Active role of the inventors during 
the commercialization 
Profit Break-even Loss  Missing 
value 
Total 
No    26  18    20    4    68 
Yes 216  77  109  60  462 
Total 242  95  129  64  530 







Table 4. Performance of the commercialization across renewed and expired patents, 
number of patents. 
Commercialized patents 
Performance   Renewed / expired patents 







1–3 years      5    5     9  0  19  33    52 
4–5 years    11    7    23  0  41  55    96 
6–7 years    33  17    29  0  79  58  137 
 
Expired patents, 
number of years 
after application 
> 7 years    24    6    20  0  50  52  102 
Subtotal of expired patents    73  35    81  0  189  198  387 
Patents renewed in 2004  169  60    48  64  341  139  480 
Total  242 95 129  64  530  337 867 
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Dummy which equals 1 if the owners sold the patent, and 0 otherwise 
Dummy which equals 1 if the owners licensed the patent, and 0 otherwise 
Dummy which equals 1 if commercialized in an existing firm, where inventors are employed (not 
owners), and 0 otherwise 
















II  EXTERN 
 
Dummy which equals 1 if somebody else than the inventor is responsible for the 








Dummy which equals 1 if inventors are active during the commercialization, and 0 otherwise 
Interaction dummy between ACTIVE and LIC or EMPL 
Interaction dummy between ACTIVE and SELL, NEW, or if the patent was commercialized in an 















Dummy which equals 1 for medium-sized firms (101-1000 employees), and 0 otherwise 
Dummy which equals 1 for small firms (11-100 employees), and 0 otherwise 











The patent stock of the owner at the application date 
Dummy which equals 1 if the product replaced a previous product for the owners, and 0 otherwise 
Dummy which equals 1 if the owners have more substituting patents, and 0 otherwise 











Starting year of the commercialization 







Share of inventors with an ethnical background other than Western European or North-American 






Note: The roman figures I and II refer to in which model the variables are included. The signs “+.”, “–” and “?” indicate a positive, a negative and an unsettled expected influence on 
the profit level, respectively. Expected impacts are only shown for the main explanatory variables.    
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Table 6. Empirical estimations of the ordered probit model. Model I. 
Dependent variable: PERFORM    Statistical model:  
Ordered probit model 
(without sample selection) 
Ordered probit model 
(with sample selection) 
Model  Explanatory variables 































































































    1.28 *** 
   (0.30) 
    1.03 *** 
   (0.21) 
    0.64 *** 
   (0.18) 
    1.24 *** 
   (0.31) 
    0.96 *** 
   (0.21) 
    0.61 *** 
   (0.18) 
    0.68 ** 
   (0.33) 
    0.62 *** 
   (0.22) 
    0.21 
   (0.19) 
    0.70 ** 
   (0.33) 
    0.61 *** 
   (0.22) 
    0.26 
   (0.19) 
    0.84 *** 
   (0.29) 
    0.62 *** 
   (0.20) 
    0.25 





























































   -0.010 
   (0.034) 
   -0.030 
   (0.047) 
    4.4 E-3 
   (0.035) 
   -0.042 
   (0.048) 
   -8.1 E-3 
   (0.035) 
   -0.036 
   (0.048) 
   -7.4 E-3 
   (0.031) 
   -0.029 
   (0.044) 
    1.2 E-3 
   (0.032) 
   -0.039 
   (0.044) 
    -2.0 E-3 
   (0.032) 
   -0.032 



































   14.71 
     0.70 
   14.11 
     0.60 
    2.62 
     0.57 
     3.33 















Log Likelihood function 
Test vs. restricted model (1 d.f.) 
   -898.8    -896.7     -893.3   -896.6 
    4.45 ** 
 -894.3 
    4.76 ** 
 -890.5 
   5.52 ** 
Parameter tests 
SELL1 - NEW1 
 

























Note: The number of observations equals 466. The dependent variable PERFORM takes on the values of 2, 1 and 0 for 242, 
95 and 129 observations, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses and ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 
and 10 percent level, respectively. Dummy variables as well as estimates from the first probit selection step are shown in 
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Table 7. Empirical estimations of the ordered probit model. Model II. 
Dependent variable: PERFORM    Statistical model:  
Ordered probit model 
(without sample selection) 
Ordered probit model 
(with sample selection) 
Model  Explanatory variables 
II-A II-B II-C II-D II-E  II-F 



















































    1.03 *** 
   (0.24) 
    0.94 *** 
   (0.17) 
    0.66 *** 
   (0.16) 
    1.06 *** 
   (0.25) 
    0.90 *** 
   (0.17) 
    0.65 *** 
   (0.17) 
    0.50 * 
   (0.28) 
    0.55 *** 
   (0.19) 
    0.22 
   (0.17) 
    0.26 
   (0.22) 
    0.37 *** 
   (0.15) 
    0.11 
   (0.14) 
    0.53 ** 
   (0.22) 
    0.48 *** 
   (0.15) 
    0.19 





























































   -0.013 
   (0.034) 
   -0.023 
   (0.047) 
    -6.1 E-3 
   (0.035) 
   -0.033 
   (0.047) 
   -0.011 
   (0.035) 
   -0.029 
   (0.048) 
   -9.1 E-3 
   (0.030) 
   -0.023 
   (0.043) 
    -2.6 E-3 
   (0.028) 
   -0.028 
   (0.038) 
    -2.1 E-3 
   (0.029) 
   -0.024 



































   19.41 
     0.70 
   17.44 
     0.58 
    5.20 
     0.46 
     3.77 















Log Likelihood function 
Test vs. restricted model (1 d.f.) 
   -901.9    -900.6     -896.3   -899.3 
    5.33 ** 
 -897.2 
    6.73 *** 
 -893.6 
   5.48 ** 
Note: The number of observations equals 803. The dependent variable PERFORM takes on the values of 2, 1 and 
0 for 242, 95 and 129 observations, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses and ***, ** and * indicate 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. Dummy variables as well as estimates from the first 
probit selection step are shown in Appendix Table A3.    
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Table 8. Size interpretation of estimated parameters. Ordered probit. 
Marginal effect on probabilities when dummy variables increase from 0 to 1. 
Model I-C  Model I-F 
 
Dummy variables 












  0.02 
  0.37 
  0.38 









  0.03 
  0.21 
  0.22 








  0.24 





   0.17 
  0.31 
Model II-C  Model II-F   
Dummy variable 
P(0)  P(1)  P(2)  P(0)  P(1)      P(2) 















Note: All marginal effects are calculated around the means of the x:s. The sum of the marginal effects on the 










Table A1. Explanatory variables included in the Probit sample selection equation. 





Dummy which equals 1 for medium-sized firms (101-1000 employees), and 0 
otherwise 
Dummy which equals 1 for small firms (11-100 employees), and 0 otherwise 




Percent of R&D financed by government 
Percent of R&D financed by private venture capital 











The patent stock of the owner at the application date 
Dummy which equals 1 if the owners have more substituting patents, and 0 
otherwise 
Percent of the patent that is directly or indirectly owned by the inventors 
Dummy that equals 1 if complementary patents are needed to create a product, and 
0 otherwise 
Number of inventors 
Share of inventors with an ethnical background other than Western European or 
North-American 
Share of inventors who are females 
Region dummies 
Technology dummies 
Time  dummies 
Five additive region dummies 
Fifteen additive technology dummies 
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Table A2. Estimation of dummy variables, Model I. 
Dependent variable: PERFORM    Statistical model:  
Ordered probit model 
(without sample selection) 
Ordered probit model 
(with sample selection) 
Model  Dummy variables 
























































































































































































































































































Note: The number of observations equals 466. The dependent variable PERFORM takes on the values of 2, 1 and 
0 for 242, 95 and 129 observations, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses and ***, ** and * indicate 
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Table A3. Estimation of dummy variables, Model II. 
Dependent variable: PERFORM    Statistical model:  
Ordered probit model 
(without sample selection) 
Ordered probit model 
(with sample selection) 
Model  Dummy variables 
























































































































































































































































































Note: The number of observations equals 466. The dependent variable PERFORM takes on the values of 2, 1 and 
0 for 242, 95 and 129 observations, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses and ***, ** and * indicate 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
 
 